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Abstract
This paper examines if experience from entry in one market can potentially enhance profitability
at a future market opportunity for a related product. We formulate and estimate a dynamic
game of entry in which forward looking firms make decisions not just based on present benefits
of past entry but also anticipating potential future benefits of current entry. Dynamic spillovers
of entry are incorporated through a firm specific unobservable (to the researcher) cost that
depends on past entry decisions. The unobserved costs may also be serially persistent. Thus,
the model allows for firm specific unobserved heterogeneity that evolves based on firm actions.
The challenge of estimating a dynamic game with serially correlated unobserved state variables
subject to endogenous feedback is overcome by embedding a particle filter based technique in
a Nested Fixed Point Algorithm. Using an application to a stylized model of entry in the
generic pharmaceutical industry we underscore the motivation for the model specification and
the methodology developed. Our estimates imply positive spillover effects of entry. Moreover,
these spillovers suggest heterogeneity not just across firms but also within firms over time based
on their history of entry decisions. Our results illustrate that entry may potentially provide
firms with additional strategic advantage in later markets, and that entry spillovers may be an
important factor to consider in the equilibrium evolution of the generic drug industry.
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1 Introduction
One of the most significant decisions with long term implications for itself and its rivals that a
firm makes is whether or not to enter a new market. Moreover, this decision can be drastically
different in a dynamic setting when entry opportunities occur repeatedly over time from that in a
static environment. In such a setting there may be dynamic spillovers of entry on profitability in
related future markets, i.e., experience gained from entering a market could enhance profitability
when entering markets for related products in the future. In the presence of dynamic spillovers
a firm with a long term perspective may even enter a market when the current opportunity is
unprofitable. This can happen if the entry experience leads to greater cumulative profitability from
the markets that the firm enters subsequently. Consequently, a forward looking firm’s decision to
enter a product market may be determined not just by expected profits in that market but also by
the effect of the current entry decision on future profitability in related product markets.1
In this paper we analyze the dynamic spillover effects of entry decisions of firms on future
market performance. In order to do this we formulate and estimate a dynamic game that incorpo-
rates spillover effects of current entry on future latent (to the researcher) costs, and consequently
future entry decisions. Hence, spillovers imply that heterogeneity among firms arises based on
the history of their actions.2 Given the potential spillovers of entry on latent costs, the model
needs to accommodate unobserved state variables that are endogenous to firm actions and possibly
serially correlated. We address the methodological challenge of estimating such a model using a
particle filter based technique. Although, there have been substantial recent developments in the
empirical literature on estimation of dynamic games, incorporating unobserved (to the researcher)
state variables that are serially correlated and endogenous remains prohibitively difficult (see e.g.,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009)). We illustrate our method with an application to the generic
pharmaceutical industry.
In contrast to static entry models, our approach allows for, and distinguishes between the
dynamic long run and static short run incentives faced by forward looking strategic firms. It is
particularly important to incorporate both these incentives because the the entry threshold in the
1Consider for example the decision of Rupert Murdoch’s (then nascent) Fox network to enter the market for
broadcasting NFL football games on TV in 1993. At that time it was estimated by industry analysts that Fox
would lose between $500 and $700 million on its bid if it were successful in acquiring NFL broadcasting rights.
The conjectured rationale for this entry decision was that it helped Fox build a reputation and loyalty. As an
industry insider explained “Fox needed to establish that it was willing and able to compete with the three established
networks...Football gave them instant credibility in that area. It was through sports that a lot of viewers got their
first glimpses of Melrose Place or The Simpsons or 90120. From that standpoint it was worth it. We might not have
the X-Files if not for football on Fox (Anand and Conneely (2003a), p. 1).” Ex post, back-of-envelope calculations
suggest that the bid price was fair and even conservative; in other words, the anticipated cross-product spillovers
were large and relevant (Anand and Conneely (2003a; 2003b)). Another related example is in the M&A context of
learning in alliances by firms that enter multiple ones (Anand and Khanna (2000)). In this case there are some firms
that are serial acquirers with the strategy of entering a new sector by first acquiring a “platform” company with the
explicit intention of expanding with “bolt-on” acquisitions.
2See Shen and Villas-Boas (2010) for a recent theoretical paper that also explores entry decisions of forward looking
firms in dynamically evolving markets.
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dynamic context is very different from that in a static context. In a dynamic setting, firms have
an incentive to enter even if they make losses in the short run as long as entry raises the present
discounted value of the stream of expected future profits in the long run. Such dynamic incentives
are ignored by static models which require that a firm enter only if the current profits are non-
negative. In the absence of incorporating such dynamic long run incentives it would not be possible
to estimate the dynamic spillovers of entry if these existed.
Our research is related to the work of Keane (1994) that used particle filters or sequential
importance sampling to develop a computationally feasible simulation based estimator for limited
dependent variable panel data models in the presence of serially correlated errors. A special case
of that estimator is the well-known Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator (see e.g., Ha-
jivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud (1996), Geweke and Keane (2001)) that arises for a particular
choice of importance sampling densities. Another strand of related research is the work on dynamic
linear models that has employed Kalman-Filters (e.g., Naik, Raman, and Winer (2005), Sriram,
Chintagunta, and Neelamegham (2006), Jap and Naik (2008), Bass, Bruce, Murthi, and Majum-
dar (2007), Bruce (2008)). The important difference is that Kalman-Filters require the dynamic
relationships to be linear and error terms to be Gaussian whereas our paper allows for non-linear
relationships and non-Gaussian error terms. The critical distinction is that the particle filter in our
research embeds the solution to a dynamic game.3 Moreover, the unobserved state variable (i.e.,
cost) allows for endogenous feedback in contrast to most particle filter models in which unobserved
variables evolve exogenously.
There is a long history of research on spillovers of experience and broadly speaking learning
curves in various contexts and disciplines, e.g., Ebbinghaus (1913), Wright (1936), Arrow (1962),
Bass (1980) and Dolan and Jeuland (1981). However, it has been difficult to estimate spillovers
in a dynamic oligopolistic context that explicitly accounts for strategic interaction between firms.
An exception is the work of Benkard (2004) who incorporates learning by doing in a dynamic
oligopoly model to examine such experience spillovers in the manufacture of aircraft, specifically,
the Lockheed L-1011.
There is an extensive literature on estimating discrete games. Static games of entry and strategic
firm interaction have been estimated among others by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b), Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991a), Berry (1992), Scott-Morton (1999), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), Zhu and Singh
(2009), Orhun (2013), Vitorino (2008), Datta and Sudhir (2009) and Ellickson and Misra (2008). In
this literature the paper most closely related to ours is the work of Jia (2008) who examines entry
spillovers across multiple markets in a static duopoly context.4 Dynamic models of entry have been
analyzed by, e.g., Hitsch (2006), Ching (2010a), and Shen (2010). However, to our knowledge there
3This is through the measurement or observation equation which in our case is the decision to enter and requires
the solution of the dynamic game to compute. Details are provided in Section 5.
4As Jia (2008) states, her paper, “is not applicable to oligopoly games with three or more chains (pp. 1265-1266)”
because the model requires that one firm’s gain is the other firm’s loss, an assumption which cannot be satisfied in
an oligopoly model like ours with more than two firms. The market chains in the context of Jia’s model correspond
to firms in our model.
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is no empirical work on incorporating the dynamic spillovers of entry and the consequent serial
correlation in the underlying pay-off relevant state variables in game theoretic oligopoly models.
Analysis of supply side decisions in the generic pharmaceutical firm industry has been a topic
of considerable empirical research (e.g., Reiffen and Ward (2005), Ching (2010a)). The benchmark
paper in modeling entry in to multiple markets remains Scott-Morton (1999) that estimates a static
entry model to show that entry can be predicted by a firm’s organizational experience, size of the
market and whether the entry opportunity is similar to the firm’s existing portfolio of drugs.5
Our work extends this research along three significant dimensions. First, we recognize linkages
across different markets because entry into one market may provide an advantage in later markets.
Second, if such linkages exist then firms may anticipate such advantages and incorporate this into
their decision making, i.e., make decisions not just based on present benefits of past entry but also
anticipating future benefits of current entry. Third, we allow for firms to be asymmetric and their
unobserved type to evolve over time. A recent paper by Amisano and Giorgetti (2013) also analyzes
the dynamics of entry by pharmaceutical firms. Using a “reduced-form discrete-choice panel data
framework (p. 667)” they estimate a dynamic probit model to examine the determinants of entry
such as firm size, intensity of competition, demand conditions, and proxies for sunk cost in multiple
markets. Like our model the paper allows for linkages between past and current entry, and across
the markets for different products. However, an important distinction is that in contrast with
our work the strategic nature of repeated and dynamic oligopolistic competition between forward
looking rival firms in not explicitly incorporated in the model.
Our research also contributes to the wider literature on the estimation of games. There is
a growing literature on estimating static6 and dynamic7 games of incomplete information. This
literature has mostly relied on a two step estimation strategy building on the Conditional Choice
Probability (CCP) estimator of Hotz and Miller (1993). The two step estimation strategy requires
the assumption that there is no market or firm level unobserved heterogeneity other than a random
shock that is distributed IID across both time and players. This assumption is restrictive because it
rules out unobserved dynamics in the latent state variables. It also rules out any private information
5Although, specific examples are hard to find (presumably due to firms not wanting to publicize these for propri-
etary reasons), there exists corroborating anecdotal evidence in the empirical literature on the existence of spillovers
in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., Scott-Morton (1999), Amisano and Giorgetti (2013), Conti and Berndt (2013)).
Such spillovers may arise on the supply side due to fixed costs of investments that may have to be made as part of the
regulatory approval process. For example, some drugs are controlled substances that require a large and sophisticated
security infrastructure to be in place before a firm is allowed to manufacture the drug. However, once this infras-
tructure is in place it can be used in the manufacture of any other drug that is classified as a controlled substance.
Another example is liquid active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) that have to be sterilized using filtration. The
packaging of these into a final “fill and finish” product requires aseptic and automated filling in to vials and syringes
by keeping human intervention to a minimum. Such automated aseptic “fill and finish” infrastructure is a fixed cost
but can be used across various liquid APIs once in place. “Specialized expertise and automated, aseptic fill and finish
procedures likely provide ANDA holders significant cost advantages in injectable drug production due to economies
of scope (Conti and Berndt, p. 5, 2013).”
6See e.g., Rysman (2004), and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010).
7See e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007),
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2010), Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2007), and Shen (2010).
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that a player might have about competing firms that the researcher does not have. Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) have extended the literature on two step
CCP estimation of dynamic discrete models using finite mixture methods to allow for discrete
forms of unobserved heterogeneity. However, these methods are are tractable only for market level
unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast, our method is applicable even when the unobserved variable
is continuous, and specific to the agent and not just at the market level. Furthermore, our method
allows for the unobserved variable to be endogenous to past actions, i.e., endogenous feedback. As
far as we know, games of complete information have only been estimated in a static context, e.g.,
Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010). The complete
information assumption allows substantial unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firm. These
games typically require the use of a combinatorial algorithm to search for an equilibrium instead of
the continuous fixed point mapping used in incomplete information models to compute equilibria.
We believe we are the first to estimate a dynamic game of complete information.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on incorporating unobserved heterogeneity in the
estimation of discrete dynamic programming models. In the single agent framework, there is a well-
developed literature that allows for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., Keane and Wolpin
(1997), and a smaller literature that allows for serially correlated unobserved endogenous state
variables (e.g., Erdem and Keane (1996), Khwaja (2010)). A Bayesian approach for single agent
discrete dynamic programming models with unobserved state variables that are serially correlated
over time has been developed by Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009), and extended by Norets (2009).
These papers use MCMC for integrating out the unobserved state variables. In contrast, we use
particle filters (or sequential importance sampling) to integrate out the unobserved state variables
and use MCMC to iterate through the parameter space in estimating the model. In addition we are
the first to apply this method to estimate a discrete dynamic game with multiple agents whereas
the previous literature has focused on single agent models. Incorporating such strategic interactions
poses a substantial computational burden in solving and estimating the model.
In related work (Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2016)), we address several issues not analyzed in
this paper. We build on the current paper to examine theoretical properties of a Bayesian approach
using a particle filter to estimate dynamic models with small and large number of players. More
specifically, we derive an unbiased estimate of the likelihood within a MCMC algorithm which
verifies that the method is exact for Bayesian inference. A key variation in the MCMC algorithm
in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2016) is that at each repetition of the chain the initial seed that
determines all random draws within the filter is proposed along with the parameter values. This
has the computational advantage that it reduces the number of simulation draws that are required
in order to evaluate the likelihood. The algorithm in Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2016) is closer
to the work of Flury and Shephard (2010). In contrast, these aspects are not present in this
paper, which uses instead an algorithm similar to that also found in Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez (2005). In addition, Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2016) shows that the algorithm
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developed works not just for dynamic entry models but also for Ericson and Pakes (1995) style
models. In particular, when used in a setting with a large number of players with the solution
concept of Oblivious Equilibrium developed by Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008).
We estimate the model using data from generic drug industry. The generic pharmaceutical
industry provides a good context for applying our model and method because of the following
characteristics: (i) there is a high frequency of new entry opportunities that arise in sequence, (ii)
there are potential economies of scope, e.g., due to working with a particular ingredient, therapeutic
class, or form of drug (e.g., oral liquid or liquid injectable), possibly leading to dynamic spillovers of
experience (see e.g., Scott-Morton (1999), Amisano and Giorgetti (2013)), (iii) it is an oligopolistic
industry with firms that ostensibly take a strategic and long-term perspective in making decisions8
and (iv) pay-offs are relatively big as are the fixed costs of entry so entry decisions have important
consequences. Our estimates imply positive spillover effects of entry. Moreover, these spillovers
lead to heterogeneity not just across firms but also within firms over time based on their history
of entry decisions. Our spillover estimates underscore the motivation for the model specification
and the methodology developed, and illustrate that entry spillovers may be a potentially important
factor to consider in the equilibrium evolution of the generic drug industry.
In summary, two important contributions of our paper that we highlight through the empirical
application to real data are: (1) developing a framework to estimate dynamic discrete games
in which unobserved firm states evolve based on past actions, and (2) bridging the literatures
on estimation of linear models with latent states using a Kalman-Filter (which is a special case
of particle filters) and dynamic structural models. More generally, our method is applicable to
estimating dynamic games in which (i) the choice set is discrete in nature, e.g., entry and exit,
expansion or reduction of product categories, introduction of new or discontinuation of old brands,
technology adoption or upgrades, relocation, start up or shut down decisions of stores, firms, or
factories etc., (ii) when there are serially correlated unobserved endogenous state variables (either
discrete or continuous), and (iii) an algorithm to solve the game is available.
2 Data and Background
The generic drug industry is a very big and important part of the U.S. pharmaceutical market, e.g.,
it comprised about 65% of all prescriptions and about $58.5 billion in sales in 2007. In this paper
we use the unique data assembled by Scott-Morton (1999) on the entry decisions of generic drug
manufacturers from 1984 to 1994.9 This time period is particularly interesting because of a big
change in regulation, i.e., the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act which lowered barriers to entry for generic
firms by permitting Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs). This vastly increased entry in
8It is possible that there may be exceptions to this, e.g., among fringe firms. However, given that our focus is on
dominant firms this framework may be a plausible place to start. Moreover, we have also estimated a version of the
model for boundedly rational firms given the alternative possibilities.
9We are grateful to Fiona Scott Morton for providing us with her data, and to Derek Gurney for answering our
questions about the data.
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to the generic market as it relaxed the requirements for generic firms to gain FDA approval. Generic
firms did not have to repeat all the tests that the manufacturer of the pioneer branded product
had undertaken but instead were only required to show that the generic product was bioequivalent
and had identical characteristics in strength, dosage form and route.
We refer the reader to Scott-Morton (1999) for details of the data set and the institutional
environment and just summarize the facts relevant for our study here. In particular we emphasize
the features of the industry that make it attractive for applying our model. (i) The preparation of
an ANDA takes months to years because it requires the existence of manufacturing facilities that
need to be inspected and approved by the FDA prior to launch of full scale operations. (ii) The
costs of submitting an ANDA can range from $250,000 to $20 million while the average revenues
for generic firms in one-firm markets are $10 million. Thus, the cost of submitting an ANDA is
very heterogeneous and high, even though it is much less than that for a new drug invention. (iii)
Furthermore, the size and heterogeneity of entry cost relative to the size of market revenue lead to a
small number of entrants supported by each market. (iv) In addition, the FDA does not reveal when
and from whom it receives ANDA applications. (v) Announced entry is very rare, because firms
do not want to signal the common market value. They also fear that the delay in the approval
will invite competition. (vi) There are few late sequential movers who withdraw in response to
rivals’ approvals. (vii) Simultaneous moves in a dynamic context are an important feature of
this industry. These characteristics of the data are consistent with our modeling assumption of a
dynamic simultaneous entry game among a small number of competing pharmaceutical firms in
which firms have to face substantial competition after they incur the cost of entry.
In constructing our estimation sample we use the following information for each market op-
portunity: ANDA submission date, ANDA approval date, characteristics of drug (i.e., ingredient,
concentration, route, form), characteristics of drug markets (i.e., drug therapeutic class, patent
expiration date, revenue of brand name drug the year before expiration), characteristics of firms
(i.e., parent or subsidiary firm, whether firm was indicted in a bribery scandal). Also of note is that
in 1989 there was a “generic scandal” in which some FDA reviewers were caught accepting bribes
to expedite ANDAs, and some firms were found to have used the original branded drug in place of
their own in the FDA review process. Hence, in estimating the model we focus on the period after
the FDA bribery scandal in 1989 because of the general upheaval and uncertainty in the generic
drug industry surrounding the scandal period.
We only study ANDAs for generic drugs that are orally ingested in the form of pills. Thus, we
focus on spillovers from experience in producing drugs in the form of oral solids. In this category,
for the sample period 1990-94, there are 40 market openings for which there is no missing revenue
information and 51 firms who entered at least once. We order markets according to the date when
the first ANDA was received by the FDA for a particular market opportunity. Each market category
is defined as a unique combination of primary ingredient, patent expiration date and total revenue
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for the branded drug for the last year before patent expiration.10 The top ten dominant firms in the
sample after 1989 are (in descending order of dominance): Mylan, Novopharm, Lemmon, Geneva,
Copley, Roxane, Purepac, Watson, Mutual and Lederle. The top firm, Mylan, entered 45% of the
markets, the top two 48%, the top three 55%, the top four 60%, the top five 65%, and the top ten
73%. Individually, Novopharm entered 28%, and Lemmon and Geneva entered 25% of the markets.
On average 3.3 firms enter a market, with the minimum being one and the maximum being nine
firms. More relevant in the context of our model to be described below, on average 1.2 dominant
firms enter a market. The mean revenue in thousands of dollars is 126,901, the std. dev. is 161,580,
the minimum is 72, and maximum is 614,593. In our estimation we use the log of revenue and in
that case the mean is 10.47, std. dev. is 2.1, minimum is 4.3, and maximum is 13.3.
Table 1 about here
3 Model
In this section we formally describe the dynamic oligopolistic game of entry. Our dynamic model
represents a sequence of simultaneous entry games that are inter-linked because the costs of firms
evolve based on their past entry decisions. Firms maximize profits over an infinite horizon t =
1, . . . ,∞, where each time the market is open counts as one time increment. A market opening is
defined to be an entry opportunity that becomes available to generic manufacturers each time a
branded product goes off patent. Since a time period uniquely identifies a market opening, in what
follows t is used interchangeably to denote a market opening or the time period associated with it.
In the tradition of the literature on dynamic games, the model we formulate is very stylized and
abstracts from a number of rich institutional details described in the previous section.11
The actions available to firm i when market t opens are to enter, Ait = 1, or not enter Ait = 0.
12
10Some amount of hand editing was required in constructing the sample, e.g., when the revenue number was
different due to rounding error or there was a spelling error in the primary ingredient of the drug.
11For example, we do not model the diffusion of a product in the market over time due to consumer learning (see
e.g., Ching (2010b)). Modeling the diffusion of a product over time would lead to two time indices, one for the
sequence of product markets opening over time and the other for profits over time within a product market. For
computational feasibility, we abstract from this and assume that once a firm enters a market it realizes all the payoffs
associated with that product market as a lump sum at the date of entry. Moreover, our data is not conducive to an
analysis of such diffusion of a product over time. Similarly, we do not model the decision of branded manufacturers
to introduce new drugs and create markets, or to pre-empt entry from generics (see e.g., Ching (2010a)). As is also
the convention in this literature, we assume entry decision for each firm are sequential and abstract from multiple
simultaneous decisions or a portfolio of decisions made by a firm because that would make the model computationally
intractable. We discuss this more below in Section 6. Also, as in Scott-Morton (1999) we don’t model the decisions
of pioneer brands to pre-empt entry of generics in different ways, e.g., by using legal means such as “patent thickets”
or by introducing its own generic version or partnering with another generic manufacturer. Our model is primarily
motivated by our focus on estimating the spillover effects of entry on future profitability and we leave enriching it
with such additional features to future work.
12It should be noted that we are modeling entry in to product categories, not firm entry in to an industry. As
stated by Scott-Morton (1999, p. 423), “...entry by a particular firm is a fairly irreversible decision; the costs that
can be recovered upon exit from one drug (and not a factory) are close to zero.” Moreover, there are no exits in
our data, which is a sub-sample of the Scott-Morton (1999) data. Our dynamic model builds on her static set up
and she does not model exits either. Furthermore, even if a firm were to exit a category it could presumably still be
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Empirically this is determined by whether a firm submits an ANDA or not. There are I firms in
total so that the number of entrants in market t is given by
Nt =
I∑
i=1
Ait (1)
The primary source of dynamics is through the evolution of (latent) firm costs with endogenous
feedback from past actions. The firm specific total costs for the current entry opportunity, Cit, are
unobserved to the researcher. These are determined in part by past entry decisions and random
shocks that may affect each firm’s costs. The past entry decisions account for spillovers of past
industry experience on costs at the current entry opportunity. We will follow the standard conven-
tion that a lower case quantity denotes the logarithm of an upper case quantity, e.g., cit = log(Cit).
The log cost of a firm is assumed to follow a stationary autoregressive process of order one to allow
for serial persistence in firm level costs. The equation governing the log cost of firm i at market t is
cit = µc + ρc(ci,t−1 − µc)− κcAi,t−1 + σceit, (2)
where eit is a normally distributed shock with mean zero and unit variance, σc is a scale parameter,
κc is the entry spillover or immediate impact on cost at market t if there was entry in market t− 1,
µc is a location parameter that represents the overall average of the log cost over a long period
of time. It should be noted that a priori the model allows for both positive (κc > 0) or negative
spillovers (κc < 0). In contrast with the positive spillovers discussed earlier, negative spillovers
may arise due to capacity or resource constraints. As the resources required for entry are stretched
beyond their limits it may not be possible to expand the pool of resources that can be devoted to
additional projects easily. For example, a team that is working on formulating a particular drug
or guiding it through the FDA approval process may only be able to work on a small number of
projects at a given time and it may not be easy to hire additional members for the team or expand
the number of teams.
The autoregressive parameter ρc represents the degree of persistence between the current cost
and its long run stationary level. The cost process exhibits state dependence on lagged entries, and
also accumulates heterogeneous random cost shocks σceit over time. The model allows for unob-
served heterogeneity between firms through the effects of current decisions on future latent costs.
Alternatively put, heterogeneity arises in the model based on endogenous feedback of past actions
of the firms. Instead of specifying unobserved heterogeneity as a time invariant firm specific fixed
effect we employ a more general model that allows for serially persistent unobserved heterogeneity
in cost that varies over time based on past actions.13
operational in other product categories. Also, if modeling another empirical setting in which exits are observed then
extending our framework to allow for exits would be potentially feasible and interesting.
13In an even richer specification not reported here we estimated a version of the model that allowed for firm
specific µi,c. A statistical test could not reject the equality of the µi,c. We demonstrate why this may be the case
in Section 6 below. Thus, we estimate the more parsimonious version in the paper with µc. However, in estimating
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We assume, as in Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999), that this is a game of complete
information. As far as the researcher is concerned the log cost can be decomposed into a sum of
two components, a known component (or observable to the researcher based solely on past actions),
ck,i,t, and a component unobservable to the researcher, cu,i,t, as follows:
ci,t = cu,i,t + ck,i,t (3)
cu,i,t = µc + ρc (cu,i,t−1 − µc) + σceit (4)
ck,i,t = ρc ck,i,t−1 − κcAi,t−1 (5)
From these equations it is seen that the location parameter µc can be interpreted as the stationary
long run mean of the unobservable portion of log cost and that the total impact of entry spillover
at market t of a firm’s past entry decisions is ck,i,t = −
∑∞
j=0 ρ
jκcAi,t−j−1. The classification of
the known (or observed) and unobserved components of the cost process is convenient for the
implementation of the particle filtering algorithm described below in Section 5.14 This convention
avoids insurmountable computational difficulties in solving for the equilibrium of the model that
would arise if unequal spacing between market openings were assumed. Furthermore, in view of
the excellent fit to the data that we are able to achieve (see Section 7 below) this timing convention
appears reasonable a posteriori.
The total (lump sum) revenue to be divided among firms who enter a market at time t is
Rt = exp(rt), which is realized from the following independent and identical distribution,
rt = µr + σreI+1,t , (6)
where eI+1,t is normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance. In equation (6), µr is
a location parameter that reflects the average total revenue for all the firms across all market
opportunities, and σr is a scale parameter. In our data the measure we have for total revenue is
from the last year the brand name drug was on patent. We interpret this value as being exogenously
determined solely by the firm manufacturing the branded product prior to the entry decisions of the
the model we do allow for heterogeneity in the initial costs ck,i,−1 of firms based on the history of their actions
using a pre-estimation sample. Section 4 provides details. We find firm specific heterogeneity in the initial cost is
sufficient to capture the key features of the data as described in Section 7. In addition, we incorporate structural
state dependence through the lagged entry decisions. We account for state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity
directly by incorporating both in our model explicitly. The difference in capabilities for each firm can arise from
either endogenous path-dependent unobserved heterogeneity or time invariant firm fixed effects. Given that we could
not reject the equality of firm specific µi,c our approach emphasizes the former in favor of the latter. Although, our
approach does accommodate some degree of time invariant firm fixed effects through the heterogeneity in the initial
conditions (see Equations (3), (4), and (5)).
14In modeling the dynamic cost process (equation (2)) we focus on the sequence of market openings and not
duration between the openings. An extension would be to model this duration. An implication of our specification in
equations (3)-(5) is that irrespective of the calendar time that has elapsed between any two adjacent market openings,
the cost changes are of the same magnitude. Such an assumption is implicit and common in much of the literature
on structural entry models. Moreover, this is a plausible assumption in our context as in our estimation sample
(described earlier in Section 2) there are 40 openings in the period 1990-94, i.e. on average a market opens every 1.5
months. For the ANDA dates shown in Table 1 the mean interval is 42 days and the standard deviation is 37. In
fact, the time interval between each two adjacent entries appears to be close enough to six weeks to use six weeks as
an approximation for the true interval between entries.
10
generic firms, and being proportional to the total discounted value of the revenue flows to generic
drugs after patent expiration. Firms have rational expectations about revenues at future market
opportunities.15
A total of fifty one firms entered the market after the 1989 FDA bribery scandal. Computing a
solution to a dynamic game of strategic interactions between fifty one players is not computationally
feasible.16 Therefore, we consider only the dominant firms. We consider two cases where the
potential entrants are either: (1) the top three or (2) top four dominant firms, i.e., I = 3 or I = 4.
In each case the remaining firms are combined into a category referred to as “other” as described
below.17 The function that relates the entry decisions of the dominant firms to the fraction of the
market allocated to the other firms is taken as given and is anticipated by the dominant firms when
considering entry. The procedure we use to implement this is described in detail next.
15Following the Scott-Morton (1999) set up we take the revenue in the last year before patent expiration for a
branded product as a proxy of the size of the market for the generic entrants after patent expiration. As discussed
below our model allows for the share of revenues to be determined by the number of generic entrants in equilibrium.
Our assumption that firms can anticipate how much revenue a given entry opportunity offers is reasonable if the
following are valid: (i) firms are not observed exiting in the data, and (ii) the markets tend not to come to an
unanticipated end. These conditions are plausibly true in our empirical setting. We do not observe any exits in our
data as stated above. Typically, manufacturers of branded products develop the market (e.g., through advertising
or detailing to physicians) prior to patent expiration. After the patent has expired the incentives for a branded
manufacturer to continue such promotional activities is substantially reduced. Furthermore, generic entrants also do
not tend to carry out such promotional activities after patent expiration. It is also worth noting that FDA drug
approval process is quite long, taking multiple years, and once drugs are approved it is known when their patent will
expire. Additionally, the market for a particular generic product typically (with some exceptions) tends to have a
finite lifetime until a more newly developed branded substitute product goes off patent and is available in a generic
version. This can also be reasonably anticipated because the date a patent expires is publicly available. Thus, we
think it is reasonable to assume that firms can anticipate and form expectations about how much revenue an entry
opportunity offers based on the revenue of the branded product before patent expiration. We thank an anonymous
referee for pointing out these underlying conditions needed for our assumption about anticipation of revenues at an
entry opportunity to be plausible.
16See Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) for a discussion of the concept of Oblivious Equilibrium (OE) and
the associated method to compute the solution to dynamic games when the number of players is very large. In the OE
approach firms ignore the current states of their rivals and make decisions instead based on the long run equilibrium
aggregate state of the industry. Since we want to model strategic interaction between firms this makes using the OE
approach less appealing for us. Given the trade-off in allowing all 51 firms to interact strategically (which would
not be computationally feasible) or adopting the OE approach that abstracts from strategic interaction, we have
developed a model of strategic interaction between a subset of dominant firms that were more active and had greatest
number of entries, while treating the less active firms with lower number of entries as passive participants. Moreover,
as stated below, the top four firms enter 60% of the markets, the top five 65%, and the top ten firms 73%. Also, the
average number of firms that entered any market is 3.3, and the maximum number of firms that enter any market is
nine. Thus, including additional fringe firms does not seem to provide incremental information commensurate with
the additional computational burden that it imposes. See also the recent paper by Benkard, Jeziorski, and Weintraub
(2015) that introduces the concept of Partially Oblivious Equilibrium (POE), extending the OE concept to industries
with high concentration but many players to allow for strategic interaction between a few dominant firms. The POE
approach might be an excellent way to model the generic pharmaceutical industry in future research.
17A ‘full’ model would also incorporate the ‘fringe’ firms and their strategic interaction with the ‘dominant’ firms.
Not modeling the strategic decisions of the ‘fringe’ firms has one disadvantage that it may likely eliminate a proportion
of the equilibria that the ‘full’ model admits, which could in turn lead to a source of specification bias. Put another
way there is no guarantee yet that the estimated parameters from the ‘full’ model with 51 firms would be close to the
estimated parameters from the ‘reduced’ 3 or 4 firm model or whether the equilibria of the ‘reduced’ model would
be good approximations of equilibria of the ‘full’ model. As discussed above, estimating a ’full’ model is beyond
the scope of the current paper and computational capacity. Future work that examines these issues would be very
worthwhile whenever this is permitted by an improvement in the computational facilities.
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In the spirit of the literature on entry games (e.g., Scott-Morton (1999), Mazzeo (2002), Seim
(2006), Zhu and Singh (2009)) we define a reduced form profit function for a dominant firm i at
time t which takes the following form,
Ait (R
γ
t /Nt − Ci,t) . (7)
The firm’s total discounted profit at time t is
∞∑
j=0
βjAi,t+j
(
Rγt+j/Nt+j − Ci,t+j
)
, (8)
where β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The firm’s objective is to maximize the present
discounted value of its profit at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium action profiles
of other firms. In the above, Nt is used to denote the number of entering dominant firms. This
is to be differentiated from Nat , which is used to denote the total number of entrant firms at time
t including both dominant and non-dominant firms. Regressions indicate that logNat = b logRt,
with b ≈ 0.092, is a reasonable approximation to the total number of firms that enter a market.
The idea of this regression dates back to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b) who showed that there is a
close relationship between the number of entrants and the total market revenue. Therefore, when
one of the dominant firms is considering entry, it can anticipate that the revenue available to be
divided among all dominant firms should be larger than the average revenue available to each of
the entering firms, which is logRanticipated ≥ logR− logN
a = logR − b logR = log
(
R1−b
)
. These
considerations suggest that a reasonable functional form for with 1− b = 0.908 being a reasonable
lower bound for γ. The upper bound is one.18
The Bellman equation for the choice specific value function, Vi(Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt), for
firm i′s dynamic problem at time t is given by
Vi(Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) (9)
= Ait (R
γ
t /Nt − Cit)
+ β E
[
Vi(A
E
i,t+1, A
E
−i,t+1, Ci,t+1, C−i,t+1, Rt+1) |Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt,
]
,
where by convention −i represents the other players. The choice specific value function represents
the sum of current and future payoffs to firm i from a choice Ai,t at time t explicitly conditioning on
18In the reduced form profit function (7), we note that although we are calling the latent variable (Ci,t) firm “cost”
for expositional convenience, it represents any unobserved variable that could have dynamic spillover effects of entry
on profits. For example, the underlying sources of entry spillovers could be factors like learning by doing or economies
of scope or development of distribution networks. This is similar to the unobservable in the reduced form pay-off
function in the literature on discrete games of entry and location (e.g., Scott-Morton (1999), Seim (2006)). The
unobservable could result from either demand or supply side factors and is typically attributed to one or the other
depending on the context or convenience. As stated earlier, the spillover effect estimated in this paper pertains to
experience gained in producing drugs in the form of oral solids. Quantifying other forms of spillovers (e.g., in liquid
injectable drugs), or disentangling supply or demand side sources of these is beyond the scope of this paper and is
left for future research.
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the choices that would be made by other firms A−i,t at time t and with the expectation that firm i
and the other firms would be making equilibrium choices from period t+1 onwards conditional on
their current choices. The expectations operator here is over the distribution of the state variables
in time period t+1 conditional on the realization of the time t state variables and the action profile
at time t. Therefore Vi(Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) represents the expected payoff of firm i at stage
t of the game. The state variables include the firm specific latent costs Ci,t signifying that the
identity of each firm i is relevant.
A stationary pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game is defined by a
best response strategy profile (AEi,t, A
E
−i,t) that satisfies
Vi(A
E
i,t, A
E
−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) ≥ Vi(Ai,t, A
E
−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) ∀ i, t, (10)
where AEi,t is the entry decision of firm i for market t, A
E
−i,t the vector of entry decisions of the
other dominant firms.
This is a game of complete information. Hence, if the state, which includes the current cost of
all firms (Ci,t, C−i,t) and total revenue (Rt), is known, then the equilibrium is known. Therefore,
an ex ante value function can be computed from the choice specific value function
Vi(Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) = Vi(A
E
i,t, A
E
−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt). (11)
The ex ante value function satisfies the Bellman equation
Vi(Cit, C−i,t, Rt) (12)
= AEit
(
Rγt /N
E
t − Cit
)
+ β E
[
Vi(Ci,t+1, C−i,t+1, Rt+1) |A
E
i,t, A
E
−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt
]
,
where NEt is the number of firms that enter, which can be computed using equation (1), i.e.,
NEt =
∑I
i=1A
E
it . Equation (12) is different from the Bellman equation associated with the choice
specific value function (equation (9)) as it represents the sum of current and expected future payoffs
to firm i from an optimal choice AEi,t at time t explicitly conditioning on the equilibrium choices
that would be made by other firms AE−i,t at time t, and with the expectation that all firms would be
making equilibrium choices from period t+1 onwards. In contrast to equation (9), the expectations
operator here is over the conditional distribution of the state variables in time period t + 1 with
the value function evaluated at the best response strategy profile.
A hurdle we face is multiplicity of equilibria.19 Multiple equilibria may take the form of a
situation where one firm or another can profitably enter but if both enter then each will incur
losses. However, if neither enters then one of them would have an incentive to deviate. To deal
with multiple equilibria we adopt an explicit equilibrium selection rule that is similar to that used
by Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999). In particular, we pick the equilibrium that has the lowest
19In practice we don’t find a large number of multiple equilibria, e.g., in the three firm game the frequency of
multiple equilibria is about 4%. See Section 7 for additional details.
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aggregate cost (C =
∑I
i=1AitCit), i.e., entrants are such that the most profitable production takes
place.20
4 Likelihood Computation
In this section we describe how the likelihood is computed using the solution of the dynamic game
and the MCMC algorithm. The details of the solution method are provided in the Web Appendix.
In principle, we could use either frequentist or Bayesian methods in the analysis because an MCMC
chain can be used to compute the statistics that relate to either approach as shown by ?. However,
our likelihood is nonlinear and is not differentiable making it extremely difficult to compute and
to conduct frequentist inference. Conversely, Bayesian inference is both theoretically justified and
computationally attractive under these conditions. Therefore we apply Bayesian methods in this
paper.
Our estimation strategy is based on a nested approach wherein the solution of the dynamic game
is computed for each evaluation of a likelihood function that depends on both observable and latent
variables. To compute a likelihood that depends only on observable variables in the data, the latent
state variables are integrated out using a particle filter or sequential importance sampling. Using
the likelihood that depends only on observable data, an MCMC algorithm generates draws from
the posterior distribution of the parameters. The broad outline of the computational strategy is as
follows: (1) Generate a parameter value by means of an MCMC algorithm. (2) For that parameter
value, generate values for the latent variable over the sample period by means of the sequential
importance sampler. (3) Solve the dynamic game to compute the equilibrium outcome as function
of the observed and unobserved state variables and the parameter value. (4) Use the equilibrium
outcome generated from the solution to compute a likelihood that depends on the observed data
and latent state variables (at the given parameter value). (5) Integrate out the latent state variables
by averaging the log likelihood over repetitions of the importance sampler to obtain a log likelihood
that depends only observed variables (at the given parameter value). (6) Use the likelihood that
depends only on observed variables to make the accept/reject decision of the MCMC algorithm.
Cycling through steps (1) to (6) generates an MCMC chain that is a sample from the posterior
distribution of the parameters from which the posterior mean, mode, standard deviation, etc. can
be computed. We outline the details next.
Denote the part of the state vector that is unobservable to us by
Xt = (Cu,1,t, . . . , Cu,I,t). (13)
Also, denote the variables that we can observe by
Yt = (A
o
1t, . . . , A
o
It, Ck,1,t, . . . , Ck,I,t, Rt). (14)
20One justification for this approach is that a firm with lower costs of entry is also more likely to gain approval
from the FDA earlier although this is by no means certain, e.g., Scott-Morton (1999), Ching (2010a). Thus, the
equilibrium selection rule seems a plausible way to deal with the multiplicity issue.
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As previously, a lower case variable denotes the logarithm of an upper case variable with the
exception that at = At. With these conventions in place, we can write xt = (cu,1,t, . . . , cu,I,t), and
yt = (a1t, . . . , aIt, ck,1,t, . . . , ck,I,t, rt).
We have data for both the pre- and post-scandal periods. The pre-scandal period is indexed
by t = −n0, . . . , 0 and the values of Yt over the pre-scandal period are denoted by Ypre. The
post-scandal period is indexed by t = 1, . . . , n with values over it denoted by Ypost. While the
scandal changed the market structure thus rendering the pre-scandal data unsuitable for general
estimation, it can still be used for two purposes: First, the pre-scandal entries {Aoit}
0
t=−n0 can be
used to compute the last two pre-scandal values ck,i,−1 and ck,i,0 of the observable part of log cost
for each firm. We compute the last two pre-scandal values ck,i,−1 and ck,i,0 for each firm by running
the recursion (5) started at −n0 over the observed choices {A
o
it}
0
t=−n0 . This gives us the vectors
y−1 and y0 because (R−1, A
o
−1) and (R0, A
o
0) are also in Ypre. Thus, the pre-scandal data allow
for us to control for firm specific heterogeneity in initial costs. This firm specific cost then evolves
endogenously conditional on the entry decisions of the firm. Hence, our approach allows for both
path-dependent unobserved heterogeneity as well firm fixed effects based on initial costs.
Second, the scandal log revenues {rt}
0
t=−n0 can be used to help identify the parameters µr and
σr. From Ypre we can compute a normal likelihood for log revenue over the period −n0, . . . , 0.
Although this likelihood actually only depends on two elements (µr, σr) of θ, we denote it as
p(Ypre | θ) for convenience. We discuss estimation of this likelihood below in Section 5.
Since we are estimating a game of pure strategy, a density for the strategy profile At is a
deterministic function of (xt, rt, yt−1) and model parameters. The implication is that a likelihood
that depends only on these parameters and {(xt, rt, yt−1)}
n
t=1 would be one if we predict every entry
decision perfectly and zero otherwise. Estimation of such a likelihood with a particle filter would
be computationally difficult as each particle with positive weight would have to predict all decisions
perfectly.21
We resolve this problem by introducing a probability that allows for additional uncertainty in
the ex-post decision, qa = 1− pa, 0 < pa < 1. This yields the following likelihood for an observed
ex-post action profile Aot
p(Aot | rt, xt, yt−1, θ) =
I∏
i=1
(pa)
I(Aoit=Ait)(1− pa)
I(Aoit 6=Ait) (15)
where Ait is the predicted entry decision computed from the model given (xt, rt, yt−1) and
θ = (µc, ρc, σc, κc, µr, σr, γ, β, pa) . (16)
21It is worth noting that such a problem hasn’t arisen in the existing literature on estimating static games of
complete information with pure strategies, e.g., Berry (1992). One reason is that these models don’t allow for any
unobserved heterogeneity. Hence conditional on observables the identity of a firm is irrelevant. The implication being
that estimation can be based on the total number of entrants rather than which particular firms entered a market.
Moreover, often the choice probabilities of entry (or the probability of the number of entrant firms) do not require
solving the game numerically and can be computed in part based on expressions describing the optimal decisions of
firms.
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The full likelihood for the data is the product
∏n
t=1 p(A
o
t | rt, xt, yt−1, θ).
Although, this statistical approach is computationally useful it may not be very appealing
from the perspective of economic interpretation. In our view the most plausible interpretation
is that there is a small probability qa that planned entry decisions are not realized. This could
come about, e.g., because a decision to enter is thwarted by disapproval of an ANDA application.
Other interpretations are that (15) represents measurement error. The various interpretations
have different likelihood implications. We shall adopt the first interpretation that there is a small
probability that plans are not realized.
A firm can either take the probability qa that plans will not be realized into account or not in
making its entry decision. Since ignoring qa dramatically reduces the cost of computing a decision
and because, as seen later, ignoring qa for small pa has little effect on decisions, solving the game
with qa ignored can be viewed as a boundedly rational solution strategy.
22 However, the results
from the boundedly rational model may be limited in their generalizability. The boundedly rational
likelihood is given by (15) with At computed as described in the Web Appendix which provides
additional details on computation and estimation. Conversely, taking qa into account can be viewed
as a fully rational strategy which confers the additional benefit that qa has a clear structural
interpretation. Although, the fully rational model is computationally much more burdensome we
estimated both boundedly rational and fully rational versions of the model. The results, however,
turned out to be qualitatively similar so we only report and discuss the results for the boundedly
rational model.23 In a related paper Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2016), we analyze the fully rational
model as part of a Monte Carlo exercise examining the statistical properties of the estimator.
5 Parameter Estimation
Douced, de Freitas, and Gordon (2001) present a concise description of the particle filter or se-
quential importance sampler that we follow in describing our analysis. The densities relevant to a
sequential importance sampler are the transition density of the hidden state vector
p(xt |xt−1, θ), (17)
which is defined by recursion equation (4), the initial density
p(x0 | θ), (18)
which, from equation (4), is normal with mean µc and standard deviation σc/
√
1− ρ2c , and the
observation density
p(yt | yt−1, xt, θ) = p(A
o
t | rt, yt−1, xt, θ) p(rt | yt−1, xt, θ), (19)
22See Che, Sudhir, and Seetharaman (2007) for another example of a model of forward looking firms that are
boundedly rational.
23Results for the fully rational model are available from the authors on request.
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where, from equation (6), p(rt | yt−1, xt, θ) is normal with mean µr and standard deviation σr.
The sequential importance sampler is as follows:
1. For t = 0
(a) Start N particles by drawing x
(j)
0 for j = 1, . . . , N from the initial density equation (18).
(b) Compute
p(y0 | θ) =
∫
p(y0 | y−1, x0, θ) p(y−1, x0 | θ) dx0
.
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
p(y0 | y−1, x
(j)
0 , θ).
2. For t = 1, . . . , n
(a) For each particle, draw x˜
(j)
t from the transition density equation (17) and set
x˜
(j)
0:t = (x
(j)
0:t−1, x˜
(j)
t ).
(b) For each particle compute the particle weights wˆ
(j)
t using the observation density equa-
tion (19); i.e.
w˜
(j)
t = p(yt | yt−1, x˜
(j)
t , θ).
The parametrization in equation (15) eliminates the problem that the weights could all be
zero. It is at this stage that the game needs to be solved in order to be able to compute
the weights wˆ
(j)
t . This adds to the computational burden considerably. Hence, it is
at this step that our work differs significantly from the literature on dynamic models
using sequential importance sampling (e.g., Naik, Raman, and Winer (2005), Sriram,
Chintagunta, and Neelamegham (2006), Bruce (2008)) or the research using MCMC to
incorporate serially correlated unobserved variables in single agent models (e.g., Imai,
Jain, and Ching (2009), Norets (2009)).
(c) Normalize the weights so that they sum to one
wˆ
(j)
t =
w˜
(j)
t∑N
j=1 w˜
(j)
t
.
(d) For j = 1, . . . , N sample with replacement the particles x
(j)
0:t from the set {x˜
(j)
0:t} according
to the weights {wˆ
(j)
t }. (Note the convention: Particles with unequal weights are denoted
by {x˜
(j)
0:t}. After resampling the particles are denoted by {x
(j)
0:t}.)
(e) Compute
p(yt | y1:t−1, θ, pa) =
∫
p(yt | yt−1, xt, θ) p(yt−1, xt | y1:t−1, θ) dxt
.
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
p(yt | yt−1, x
(j)
t , θ).
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Note that p(yt | yt−1, x
(j)
t , θ) does not have to be recomputed here if the weights w˜
(j)
t are
associated to x
(j)
t in the resampling step and saved. If each firm’s entry decisions are
similarly associated, then classification error rates can be computed at this step.
3. The likelihood is
L(θ) = p(y0:t | θ) = p(Ypre | θ, pa)p(y0 | θ)
n∏
t=1
p(yt | y0:t−1, θ).
We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to estimate the model. Briefly, the method is as
follows.24 The proposal density q(θo, θ∗) defines a distribution of potential new values θ∗ given an
old value θo. Denote the likelihood by L(θ) and the prior by pi(θ). Given the value θo at the end
of the MCMC chain, one moves the chain forward one step to θ′ as follows:
1. Draw θ∗ according to q(θo, θ∗).
2. Let α = min
(
1, L(θ
∗) pi(θ∗) q(θ∗, θo)
L(θo) pi(θo) q(θo,θ∗)
)
.
3. With probability α, set θ ′ = θ∗, otherwise set θ′ = θo.
For our particular q, one randomly chooses an element j of θo to move and then proposes a new
value by replacing θoj with a draw from the normal distribution with mean θ
o
j and scale σj, where σj
is chosen such that acceptance at Step (3) occurs with a frequency of about 30% (see e.g., Gelman,
Roberts, and Gilks (1996), Roberts and Rosenthal (2001)).
The likelihood is hierarchical in that given model parameters and conditional upon the latent
cost variables, it can be evaluated by solving the game. Given this structure, estimation can be
viewed as a double-layer nesting of the conditional likelihood within an outer MCMC loop and
an inner importance sampling loop. The MCMC proposal density fixes θ in the outer loop. The
sequential importance sampler generates a sequence of cost draws within the inner loop. Solving the
game both evaluates the conditional likelihood along this trajectory of cost draws and provides the
importance sampler with the information needed to adjust costs sequentially along the trajectory
to take into account the effect of entry decisions on the trajectory. When one falls through the inner
loop, the likelihood has been averaged over costs thereby averaging out the latent cost distribution.
At this point the MCMC accept/reject decision is made and the MCMC chain is moved forward.
One iterates through the outer loop to obtain the complete MCMC chain.
In estimating parameters we use flat, noninformative priors that impose these support condi-
tions: −1 ≤ ρc ≤ 1, 0 ≤ κc, 0 < σc, and 0 < σr. A value of κc < 0 would imply negative spillovers
or an indication of resource or capacity constraints. We allowed for this when we initially started
estimating the model but did not find any evidence of this in our preliminary work. Hence we
adopted a prior that restricts spillovers to be non-negative.
24Additional details are provided in a companion Web Appendix that is not meant for publication and is available
online and from the authors directly.
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The firm’s discount factor β is extremely difficult to estimate in studies of this sort (see e.g., Rust
(1994), Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013)). Hence, the literature
on structural estimation often does not estimate such parameters but rather fixes these.25 Similarly,
we do not attempt to estimate the discount factor but set β = 0.96875 after rounding it to a nearby
fractional power of two (in order to speed computation). A common rule of thumb in business is
not to undertake a project whose internal rate of return is less than 20%. Grabowski, Vernon, and
DiMasi (2002) state that estimates of internal rates specific to the drug industry range “from 13.5%
to over 20%.” Theoretically, a firm should not undertake a project whose rate of return is less than
its cost of capital. The historical risk premium in the drug industry is 12.55%, (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee,
and Swaminathan (2001)). Adding to this a nominal borrowing rate of 5% one arrives at the value
17.55%. Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) arrive at a nominal cost of capital of 14% using a
CAPM method that they regard as biased downward. There are 40 market entry opportunities in
our five years of data. That implies an expected time increment of 0.125 years between prospective
projects for the firms in our data. Therefore, using an annual internal rate of 20%, allowing for
compounding, we arrive at the value of the discount factor reported above.
Just as for the discount factor we do not attempt to estimate the parameters γ and pa for the
reasons discussed below. Examination of equation (9) indicates that were γ to enter as a linear
factor then γ would not be identified. That in fact it enters to the first order as (1 + γ logR) does
not help matters much. Attempts to estimate γ yield estimates that are about 0.93. Therefore,
based on the plausible lower bound of 0.908 derived in Section 3 and our experience from trying to
estimate γ, we take 0.93 to be a reasonable value. Rounding to a nearby fractional power of two
(in order to speed computation), we set γ = 0.9375.
The parameter pa can either be estimated or be fixed at various values. We tried values from
0.75 to 0.95. We find that estimates of the other elements of θ are hardly affected. What we do
find is that varying pa affects the rate at which particles “die out” at Step (2d) in the sequential
importance sampler. A particle is considered to “die out” if its importance weight {wˆ
(j)
t } is zero
or very close to zero. This happens if the observation density p(yt | yt−1, x˜
(j)
t , θ) for a particular
particle trajectory tends to zero. Since we are not using the sequential importance sampler as a
smoother, the rate at which particles die out is of no concern. We always have a large number of
points available at Step (2e) of the sequential importance sampler; we experimented with different
number of particles till the results were not sensitive to the choice of number of particles. When
pa is treated as a parameter to be estimated, the performance of the MCMC algorithm is degraded
somewhat. We think that fixing pa is preferred because doing so improves performance and permits
a cleaner comparison of results across the cases I = 3, 4 that we consider in Section 7.
25See Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and Hu and Shum (2008) for more results on nonparameteric identification
of single agent dynamic discrete choice models.
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6 Identification Analysis
Non-parametric identification of dynamic games of complete information is an area of ongoing
research with few conclusive results. The main hurdles for establishing identification come from
the potential for multiplicity of equilibria and because the information set of the agent is much
richer than what is typically observed by the researcher. In this spirit it is beyond the scope of this
paper to establish non-parametric identification of our model. However, in this section we discuss
the basis for identification in our model that relies on a mix of data variation, economic modeling
and statistical assumptions.26
There are three groups of parameters in our model. The first group consists of the discount
factor β, the market share parameter for dominant firms γ and the probability parameter pa for
uncertainty in ex-post decisions. These parameters are difficult to identify (see e.g., Rust (1994),
Magnac and Thesmar (2002)). As discussed above in Section 5 we follow the literature on structural
estimation and do not attempt to estimate these parameters but rather calibrate these based on
preliminary analysis of the data. Our preliminary analysis shows that the estimation results do
not seem to be sensitive to small differences in these parameters. The second group of parameters
consists of the mean and the variance of the normal distribution of revenues. Since we observe
revenue data, they are identified directly by the sample average and the sample variance of the
revenue data.
The key parameters in our model that the estimation procedure aims to identify are the third
group of parameters, which include the stationary mean µc of the latent cost distribution, the
variance σ2c of the innovation of the cost process, and most importantly, the autoregressive coefficient
ρc of the cost process and the coefficient of lagged entry or spillover effect κc. These parameters
jointly determine the cost evolution of firms and hence their entry behavior. In the data set,
however, we observe the entry pattern of the firms over time, revenues and the number of entrants,
and do not observe the latent cost directly. At a very intuitive level identification of cost parameters
26We estimate the model using Bayesian methods and the particle filter algorithm is also a Bayesian procedure
that computes the posterior of the unobservable costs conditional on the data. Hence, the notion of classical “non-
parametric” identification is not directly applicable in our case. Although, ideas related to (non-parametric) identifi-
cation of distribution of unobservables are broadly relevant (e.g., Heckman and Singer (1984)). Simlarly the notions
related to the identification of hyper-parameters in hierarchical Bayes models are relevant in our case. Briefly, in
Bayesian settings the focus is on (parametric) identification (Hurwicz (1950), Zellner (1971)), i.e., a parameter value
θ1 is identified if there is no other value θ2 such that p(y|θ1) = p(y|θ2) ∀ y ∈ Y. If all parameter values are identified
then the model p(y, θ) is identified, and the parameter θ is identified (Lancaster (2004)). Furthermore, as stated
by Lancaster (2004), “Flat spots at the top of the likelihood pose a problem for maximum likelihood inference since
there will never be unique maxima and second derivative matrices will typically be singular at non-identified points.
It is of no special significance from the Bayesian point of view because Bayesians do not maximize likelihoods–they
combine them with priors and integrate them. A qualification to this is that if all values of a parameter on, say the,
real line are unidentified then an (improper) flat prior distribution on that line would lead to a flat posterior and
this is not allowed (p. 26).” The main identification concern in Bayesian settings is that (1) MCMC algorithms can
be constructed even when a posterior does not exist or (2) a posterior distribution may exist for a parametrically
unidentified model given a proper prior (Geweke (2005)). Alternatively put, with a properly specified prior it is
always possible to conduct Bayesian analysis of a parametrically unidentified model, i.e., the prior and posterior may
be identical for non-identified parameters. For more on identification in Bayesian settings see Poirier (1998).
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may be thought of in a way similar to the identification of such paramters in Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995). By inverting the first order condition for profit maximization Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995) are able to relate the parameters describing the unobservable costs to the observables
in their data, e.g., product characteristics (see Section 3, pp. 853-854). The analogous optimality
condition in our case comes from the Bellman equation (9). This provides a way to relate the
unobservable cost parameters to the observables, i.e., revenues, entry decisions and total number of
entrants. The main difference is that because we solve a highly non-linear dynamic programming
problem there is no simple way to invert this optimality condition to and represent it analytically
as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (see Equation 3.6, p. 854). However, it is through
exploiting the relationship generated by the optimality condition between the observed data and
unobserved cost that we are able to pin down the parameters of the cost process. Alternatively
put, these parameters are identified based on (i) variation in the choices of a given firm over time
and (ii) variation in choices in a given market across firms, with these being used to infer the
unobserved cost. Since, we are dealing with unobservable costs, we need to make some parameteric
distributional assumptions in order to infer these from the optimality conditions and then project
these on the observables in our data to estimate the cost parameters. It should be noted however
that the distributional assumptions we need to make to implement the particle filter to integrate
our the unobserved costs from the likelihood are sufficient to guarantee the identification of cost
parameters, and no extra parameteric assumptions are required. Next we discuss in detail how this
is done.
The (unobserved) cost process incorporates dependence on one period lag cost and lagged entry
that have to be inferred from the observed data on entry and revenue. This is related to the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity in pay-offs versus state dependence. We address this in multiple ways.
In a pioneering paper Heckman (1981) pointed out that one can use the panel structure of data to
exploit within agent variation in states to identify state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity.
In particular for us this requires that we observe each of the four possible transitions At−1 ∈ {0, 1}
to At ∈ {0, 1} for every (dominant) firm in our data set. As can be seen in Table 1 this is indeed the
case. Identification is aided by this source of variation with the particular exclusion restriction that
the total size of the market or revenue affects entry decisions but conversely the entry decisions of
generic manufacturers don’t affect the total market size. This would be plausible if the market size
for a drug is primarily developed by the pioneer branded product and generic manufacturers take
this market size to be pre-determined in making their decisions. Alternatively stated, the total
market revenue is determined prior to the entry of the generic firms and does not depend on the
costs of entry for generic firms. This helps to identify the parameters associated with the costs of
generic manufacturers.
Another approach to this problem is to directly incorporate firm fixed effects. As stated above
in Section 3, we estimated an alternative version which directly allowed for firm specific fixed effects
µi,c in the cost process (Equation 2) along with state dependence from lagged entry. However, we
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could not reject the statistical equality of these firm specific µi,c. This would be the case if the time
varying specification that we adopt soaks up most of the unobserved heterogeneity leaving little for
the firm fixed effects to capture. We demonstrate below how this might happen. The difference in
costs for each firm can arise from either endogenous path-dependent unobserved heterogeneity or
time invariant firm fixed effects and our approach emphasizes the former over the latter.27 To our
knowledge, we estimate one of the most general specifications of a game with asymmetric firms.
For example, the literature on estimating games largely treats players as symmetric and without
firm specific unobserved heterogeneity, but allowing for market level heterogeneity.28 In contrast,
our approach goes beyond an ad-hoc time invariant firm specific fixed effect by allowing for even
ex-ante identical firms to become heterogeneous over time as their cost evolves based on endogenous
feedback from past actions (Equation 2).29
The model assumes that firms make entry decisions sequentially across markets over time and
know the market size, i.e., the revenue of the patented drug at each market opening. The firms
also form expectations about the market size at future entry opportunities. These assumptions
play crucial roles in the identification of the model. An alternative specification might be that
firms make a portfolio of decisions for a set of entry opportunities at a time. However, we do
not adopt this specification for a number of reasons. Our analysis is at the level of subsidiary
firms which is similar to the primary specification in Scott-Morton (1999), where there is no co-
ordination over a set of entry decisions. If the analysis was at the level of parent firms it could be
that the parent firm might co-ordinate entry decisions for multiple subsidiary firms simultaneously.
Scott-Morton (1999), however, shows that “the choice of organizational level from which to analyze
entry does not drive the results (p. 434)” and so co-ordination of entry decisions over a set of
opportunities is not a concern. Furthermore, the assumption about entry opportunities being
sequential is common in the literature on estimating entry games.30 In our context assuming entry
opportunities are sequential is more plausible than assuming that firms make entry decisions on
future market openings simultaneously, despite the fact that the patent expiration dates of drugs are
well known in advance. This is because market conditions and latent firm heterogeneity variables
typically vary over time, and a decision that was ex ante optimal prior to the market opening may
no longer be optimal closer to when the market opens and new information becomes available to
firms. In addition, a model of simultaneous entry in to a group of markets will induce a much larger
set of endogenous variables due to a potential portfolio of choices, and there will not be sufficient
27Moreover, a specification with unobserved cost as a time invariant fixed effect seems less interesting to us than a
story of the dynamic evolution in unobserved cost based on past actions.
28For example, Ellickson and Misra (2008) control for unobserved heterogeneity at the market level but not at the
level of the firm. As they state on pp. 820-821, they have a two-fold approach, “The first incorporates a fixed effect
at the MSA level, while the second incorporates a random effect at the level of the cluster.”
29A structural learning model can also generate a similar implication by endogenously generating heterogeneity
across consumers in perceived quality even though if they started from identical priors. This is because the perceptions
of agents evolve based on their heterogeneous experiences, e.g., Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013).
30As an example, Hitsch (2006) models entry and exit in the breakfast cereal industry where 78 new products
were launched between 1985 and 1992 at the rate of 10 products per year (p. 28). The paper models launch of each
product as a sequence of entry decisions.
22
exclusion restrictions to identify the coefficients on all the endogenous variables.31
Another assumption we make for identification is that the revenue process (Equation (6)) evolves
with an i.i.d. error term and firms do not know the exact realization of revenues at future entry
opportunities. If firms do have more information about the future realization of revenues then
the dimension of the state space of the model will necessarily become larger and the computation
will be substantially more costly. Typically, while firms might have some information about future
market profitability than implied by the i.i.d assumption, if revenue evolves according to a first
order Markov process, then the current revenue will still be a sufficient statistic for the observed
state variable of the Bellman equation. The i.i.d assumption, can be a cause for concern of model
misspecification. Although, this assumption is common in the literature on estimating games (see
e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009)). In our case, given that the misclassification rate is small in
the current model,32 the amount of model misspecification is likely to be small.
Next, we demonstrate how with our time varying specification of path dependent unobserved
heterogeneity the fixed effects might be negligible. We have 163 market entries from 1984 through
1989 that can be used to provide additional information on certain parameters (see Section 4) but
not others due to a structural break in the data. In particular we recurse the observable part of
cost (Equation 2) through these 163 observations for each MCMC draw of θ to generate the initial
heterogeneity in firms in 1990 for that θ. Suppose, instead, that we introduce initial homogeneity
by estimating an initial condition cµ,i,1984 for each firm rather than starting these recursions in 1984
at zero, which is what we actually do. The dominant firm enters 45% of the markets; ρc and κc
of Equation (2) are about 0.99 and 0.07, respectively, which implies that the long run steady state
value for the dominant firm would be about 0.07×0.45/0.01 = 3.15. Thus, draws of cµ,i,1984 for this
firm would be about 3.15. By the time the recursion reaches 1989 the magnitude has been reduced
to 0.99163 times that value or 0.658, which is about the most that cµ,i,1990 can differ from the value
that we compute. Particles are started by adding a draw to cµ,i,1990 from the unobserved cost
component that has stationary mean µc of about 10 and stationary variance σc/(1 − ρ
2) of about
0.37/0.02 = 18.6. The value of 0.658 is going to be negligible with respect to this draw. Similar
arguments apply to all firms. For instance, the smallest firm enters 25% of the markets so that its
possible magnitude at 1989 can differ from what we use by at most 0.145. One can conclude from the
foregoing that attempting to introduce initial heterogeneity and estimate it would add three or four
poorly identified parameters without changing results substantively. This is exactly what we find in
our alternative specification as discussed above. An intuitive way to think about this is that since
the estimated serial correlation is lower than 1 (see Section 7 below) a model with time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity would fit the data worse than one that allows for time varying unobserved
31Hypothetically speaking, if one attempts to model the 40 entry decisions as a simultaneous portfolio choice then
this would become a combinatorial problem of dimension 240 for each firm. With 4 such firms, this problem has a
dimensionality of 2160. A model that allows for strategic interaction among firms that simultaneously make entry
decisions about 40 markets and moreover allows for spillovers across time from previous entry is both empirically
infeasible and computationally intractable.
32See discussion of classification error rates (CER) in Table 2 in Section 7 below.
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heterogeneity. Alternatively put, the unobserved cost variable plays the role of a serially correlated
firm specific “error term” which soaks up most of the unobserved heterogeneity. We return to
address this issue in yet another way in Section 7 below in our discussion about potential reverse
causality.
Additionally, we consider a numerical verification of identification local to our parameter esti-
mates as an analytical demonstration of identification for a model of this complexity is not available.
Figure 5 of the Web appendix plots the profile likelihoods for the three firm model and Figure 7 is
the same for the four firm model. In each panel of these plots, the indicated parameter is moved
and all others are fixed at the values that maximize the likelihood. The sharp peaks suggest local
identification in that a change to the parameter must reduce the likelihood. Profile likelihoods do
not eliminate the possibility that two or more parameters can be moved together in such a way
as to leave the likelihood invariant. A check on this is to compute the condition number of the
Hessian of the log likelihood or the condition number of its inverse, these being the same number.
If the log of the condition number is a good deal smaller than the log of machine precision, that
indicates a well conditioned Hessian and suggests that a simultaneous movement of the parameters
that leaves the likelihood invariant is impossible. The variance matrix of the MCMC chain is a
consistent estimator of the inverse of the Hessian (?). For the three firm model the log (base 10)
of the condition number of the variance matrix is 3.75 and for the four firm model it is 3.85. The
log of the precision of a “double” on the computing equipment we use is 15.7. Hence, the Hessians
are well conditioned.
7 Results and Robustness
We estimate the mode for the cases of three or four dominant firms, i.e., the top three (four)
dominant33 firms are the only potential entrants that are strategic competitors and the actions of
the remaining firms are accounted for by the parameter γ. The mode and standard deviations of the
posterior distribution are reported in Table 2. We focus on the mode of the multivariate posterior
distribution because it actually corresponds to a value at which the model has been evaluated.
Other measures of central tendency of the posterior distribution can be misleading when studying
the behavior of a structural model because they may have never appeared in the MCMC chain
and could give a distorted view of the model were it to be evaluated at such a point. We next
discuss the estimates with the caveat that our model is a stylized representation of oligopolistic
competition in the generic pharmaceutical industry, and therefore the results should be assessed
with appropriate prudence.
Table 2 about here
33Recall that Mylan, Novopharm, and Lemmon are the potential entrants in the three firm case. Geneva is the
additional potential entrant in the four firm case. There are 51 firms in total, so 48 firms are put in the “other”
non-dominant category in the three firm case and 47 in the four firm case.
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The parameters are tightly estimated34 and, as seen from the extremely low classification error
rates (CER), model fit is quite accurate.35 We begin by discussing the revenue parameters. The
mean of (log) revenue is estimated to be about 10 and the standard deviation about 1.6. As a
reality check we find that these numbers are very similar to the numbers reported in Scott-Morton
(1999). The long run mean of cost µc is also about 10. Given the caveat above we provide some
interpretation next. Since the means of revenue and long run cost are similar it implies that in a
static sense on average each market will not be able to support too many entrants.36 Interestingly,
in our sample the number of dominant firms that enter a market on average is 1.2. As a consequence
firms that enter will need to decrease their cost based on experience (Equation 2) in order to stay
profitable in the long run (Equation 8). Modeling entry decisions in a static one shot entry game
framework would suggest that in the generic drug industry firms are not very profitable on average
or that only low cost firms would enter a market. However, such a model would treat cost as
an exogenous firm characteristic. In contrast, our model by connecting the markets through the
spillovers of entry and modeling an inter-linked series of entry games is suggestive of an additional
insight that firms that do enter and lower their cost through past experience can gain additional
strategic advantage to survive these tight markets. Indeed, two firms with initially similar costs
might have very different long run trajectories if one enters a very tight market and becomes
successful based on past experience whereas the other stays out and loses the opportunity to learn
from the experience of entering a market. Put an another way, our model indicates an additional
long run reward from experience gained from entry over and above the short run profits from entry.
We further compare our work with static entry models below.
We next discuss the parameters of the cost process with the same due caution as above. The
autoregressive parameter ρc represents the degree of persistence in the cost process. The value of
ρc is quite large. This indicates that unobserved firm specific costs can be persistent and highly
path dependent. A potential implication is that the strategic effects of entry spillovers on firm
heterogeneity will be magnified in the long run. Moreover, it suggests that firm heterogeneity will
not be a fixed characteristic but will evolve over time given the history of entry decisions. The
spillover effect of entry is κc which is estimated to be 0.07. This implies a potential immediate
cost improvement of 7% going into the next market opening conditional on entry in to the current
market. Recall, in our data there are on average eight entry opportunities a year or about one
every six weeks. To gain a sense of the probable long run implications of this spillover effect we do
a thought experiment and compute the average annual cumulative improvement using the AR(1)
34Despite the small standard deviations shown in Table 2, we find that the profile likelihoods suggest that the
MCMC chain adequately explored the posterior density. See Figures 5 and 7 in the Web Appendix. The likelihood
is proportional to the posterior because priors are flat.
35The cost spillover κc is estimated to be a little larger in the case with the larger number of dominant firms. On
the other hand, as might be expected, the classification error rate is also a little larger in the game with the larger
number of dominant players.
36It should be noted that in our context this statement is really about the “dominant” firms, which are the potential
entrants in the model.
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cost process (Equation (2)). It is seen that a firm that enters all possible markets in a year will
decrease its cost by 51% (relative to a firm that did not enter at all that year). Thus, the dynamic
spillovers of entry could possibly be very large cumulatively. However, the standard deviation of
the cost process σc is also large, i.e., about 0.37. This means that although spillovers of entry can
persistent and path dependent they could potentially also be eliminated by a cost shock.Modeling
the sources of such shocks is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave that to future work.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
We further examine the implications of the dynamics of the cost process by plotting the log cost
of the dominant firms in the three firm model. This is done in the upper three panels of Figure 1.
The circles indicate that the firm entered that market.37 It is seen that the top firm, Mylan, has a
clear cost advantage over its competitors but the broad trends in cost are about the same for all
firms. These plots also suggest heterogeneity in cost across firms and additionally heterogeneity
within firms over time. Cost evolves, waxing and waning with entry or lack of it. It is seen that a
sequence of entries usually leads to cost decreasing. On the other hand periods of inactivity lead
to cost increasing. It is notable the firms enter the market both when their cost is relatively low
and high. One reason for this could be spillovers of current entry on future costs which may help
overcome the adverse current payoff from entry that high current cost implies. This is in contrast
with what a static model would predict. In the static case firms would not enter a market when
their cost was high. The bottom panel shows log total revenue. The numbers at the bottom of this
panel are the number of dominant firms who entered the market at that time point. This panel
also shows that entry tends to coincide with markets that have larger revenues but not always.
There are instances when market revenue is very high yet not all three dominant firms enter (e.g.,
markets 37, 38, 39 as indicated by the x-axis of the bottom panel). Again, this is a feature that
would be difficult to rationalize using a static entry model.
We next compare our estimates of cost and the implied cost trajectories for the three and four
firm models. Figure 2 plots together the log cost of the three dominant firms from both the three
and four firm models. The circles at the bottom of the upper panel indicate which markets Mylan
entered, the crosses in the middle panel are the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks in the lower
panel are the same for Lemmon. The construction of the plots is the same as for Figure 1. The
salient feature of this plot is that costs for the three dominant firms are estimated as being about
the same in the three and four firm models. The recovered cost trends are consistent with entry
patterns. Mylan has the most entries and the lowest cost. It’s cost trajectory is also smoothest
37The logarithm of cost is computed by averaging at Step (2e) of the importance sampler.
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because it has the least fluctuations between periods of activity and inactivity. This suggests that
its sequence of entries also manages its cost trajectory.
Using Figure 3 we examine the fit of our model. This figure displays the entry decisions of
the dominant firms, period by period, as circles and the model’s average prediction of their entry,
period by period, as crosses.38 The classification error rates shown in Table 2 can be viewed as
the errors that would obtain if decisions were predicted by using a threshold of 0.5 to predict entry
(i.e., entry if predicted probability ≥ 0.5; no entry otherwise) for the average predictions shown
in Figure 3. We find that although our entry model is highly stylized and parsimonious it does a
fairly good job of predicting entry patterns and fitting the data.
So far, we have tried to directly infer the importance of the estimate of the entry spillover κc by
examining the implications of this for cost and entry dynamics. Another way to assess our results
is to directly explore the possibility that the firms play a different game than the game we propose.
Consider two other games that might be played instead of the game with payoffs (9).They could
play a game with payoffs
Vi(Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) = Ait (R
γ
t /Nt − Cu,i,t) , (20)
where no attention at all is paid to the dynamic spillovers of entry (κc = 0) and firms ignore the
continuation value of the game (β = 0). We call this the myopic game (β = 0, κc = 0). Or they
could play a game with payoffs
Vi(Ai,t, A−i,t, Ci,t, C−i,t, Rt) = Ait (R
γ
t /Nt − Cit) (21)
where they take cognizance of the dynamic spillovers of entry but ignore the continuation value of
the game, i.e., β = 0. We call this the static game (β = 0, κc > 0).
For the three firm game, the myopic game (β = 0, κc = 0) has an equilibrium that agrees with
the solution of the game we propose (i.e., the game with payoffs (9)) in 49% of the cases. The game
that ignores the continuation value (β = 0, κc > 0) has an equilibrium that agrees in 81% of the
cases. For the four firm game, these values are 31% and 68%, respectively.
These values were computed by using the posterior modes shown for the game in Table 2 and
finding all equilibria for the three games for all cost trajectories that obtained at Step (2b) of
the sequential importance sampler. Incidentally, we can also compute the incidence of multiple
equilibria for these three games. For the three firm game they are 5% (β = 0, κc = 0), 5% (β = 0,
κc > 0), and 4% (β > 0, κc > 0), respectively. For the four firm game they are 5%, 7%, and 4%,
respectively. As discussed earlier, we adopt an explicit equilibrium selection rule, i.e., we pick the
equilibrium with the lowest aggregate cost.
These computations suggest that the myopic and static games would do a poor job of rational-
izing the data.39 To check, we use our parameter estimates, impose β = κc = 0, and find that the
38The average prediction is computed by averaging game solutions at Step (2e) of the importance sampler at the
mode of the posterior density.
39In performing these calculations we did not completely re-estimate the model with the parameters constrained.
Instead we re-solved the model at the estimated parameter values with the parameters constrained as specified above.
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overall classification error rate for the myopic game exceeds the overall value in Table 2 by a factor
of 3.8 for the three player game and 3.6 for the four player game. Similarly, imposing β = 0, we
find that the classification error rate for the static game exceeds the values in Table 2 by a factor
of 2.0 for both the three and four player games.
Given our stylized and parsimonious model, it is worth asking the question whether what is
recovered is the dynamic spillover effect of entry, i.e., entry makes firms more capable or whether
the causality is reversed and it is more capable firms that enter. In the latter case one could think
of a situation where there is persistent heterogeneity in costs across firms and the more capable
firms always enter and the less capable firms stay out. Recall that in our model heterogeneity in
costs arises endogenously based in part on past actions. Stated differently, one might surmise that
the effect of the random shocks on costs (operating through σc) is larger than that of the dynamic
spillovers of entry (through κc), or that σc and κc are correlated in some way. If this was the case
then it would be difficult to identify each separately from the other. One way to check this is to set
σc to different values and re-run the MCMC chain to see whether it affects the values of κc. Setting
σc to 0.25, 0.125, and 0.0625 has very little effect on κc although it does dramatically reduce the
likelihood evaluated at the mode. Thus, we have statistical evidence that we are able to identify
σc from κc. Hence, we conclude that we are most likely estimating the effect of entry on costs and
not vice versa.
8 Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the literature on estimating entry spillovers and also extends the literature
on estimating dynamic discrete games to allow for endogenously arising unobserved heterogeneity
between players. We illustrate our method with an application to the generic pharmaceutical
industry. Our stylized model fits the data well with small classification error rates. Our results
are suggestive of positive spillovers of past entry on future profitability and indicate that dynamic
spillovers may play a role in the equilibrium path of the industry structure. Moreover, our results
indicate possibility of heterogeneity in the cumulative effects of these spillovers not only across
firms but also within firms over time based on the entry decisions. A potential implication is
that firms may be able to manage their success through sequencing their entry in to new markets
in order to maximize the potential for learning from experience. We develop a procedure based
on particle filters to estimate a dynamic discrete game that includes firm specific unobserved state
variables that evolve based on past actions, i.e., endogenous feedback. Our method is more generally
applicable to estimating dynamic games in which (i) the choice set is discrete in nature, e.g., entry
and exit from industry, expansion or reduction of product categories, introduction of new brands,
technology adoption, relocation or shut down of stores etc., (ii) when there are serially correlated
unobserved endogenous state variables (either discrete or continuous), e.g., models which allow for
Thus, these computations are suggestive of our preferred specification being better at rationalizing the data. A more
thorough test would be to re-estimate the model for the three model specifications.
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accumulation or depreciation of goodwill of brands, and (iii) an algorithm to solve the game is
available.
Before concluding, we outline some limitations which provide opportunity for future research.
The spillover effect estimated in this paper is related to experience gained in producing drugs in
the form of oral solids. It may be worthwhile in future work to quantify spillovers for other kinds
of drugs and the sources (e.g., demand or supply side) of such spillovers. This is beyond the scope
of this paper due to the prohibitive computational burden it would impose by expanding the state
space. Another important extension would be to allow for estimation of dynamic games where
the strategy set is mixed discrete-continuous, e.g., introduction of a new brand and the associated
decision about advertising expenditure. We leave such analysis for future research. Yet another
interesting and challenging issue to examine in future might be the role of price competition in
the generic drug market especially because institutional features such as health plan co-pays and
formulary lists at hospitals etc., may lead to ambiguous effects on revenues.40 Future research
could also examine the role of multi-market contact in these entry decisions, e.g., it could analyze
whether any collusive practices exist due to this repeated contact in different product categories.
Similarly, another rich area for future research might be to analyze marketing mix activities (see
e.g., Manchanda and Chintagunta (2004), Manchanda, Rossi, and Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan,
Manchanda, and Chintagunta (2005)) in the generic pharmaceutical industry that complement
these entry decisions, and their joint effects on entry spillovers. Furthermore, even though we
focus on a game of complete information, the methods we exposit may also provide a procedure to
incorporate time varying unobserved heterogeneity with endogenous feedback in estimating dynamic
games of incomplete information. We hope our paper will provide a foundation to address some of
these issues in future.
Finally, even though our dynamic framework has limitations as discussed we believe it enriches
the literature. Our focus has been to extend the literature on dynamic games to allow for time
varying unobserved heterogeneity that accounts for the evolution of a firm based on its strategic
actions. The goal has been to account for the the dynamic implications of the nature of such
competition. This is important for two reasons: (a) firms change over time in terms of getting
stronger or weaker based on their experience, and (b) similarly, firms recognize that their rivals’
competitiveness depends on the experience of their rivals. The existing literature largely abstracts
from this kind of heterogeneity. In the interest of making headway in this direction we have
abstracted away from observed heterogeneity in other dimensions that the previous literature has
considered. Our hope, of course, is to ultimately allow for both kinds of heterogeneity in future
work.
40We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Table 1. Data
Dominant Firms
(enter = 1, not enter = 0)
Drug / Active Ingredient ANDA Date Mylan Novopharm Lemmon Geneva Total Revenue
Entrants ($’000s)
Sulindac 03 Apr. 90 1 0 1 1 7 189010
Erythromycin Stearate 15 May 90 0 0 0 0 1 13997
Atenolol 31 May 90 1 0 0 0 4 69802
Nifedipine 04 Jul. 90 0 1 0 0 5 302983
Minocycline Hydrochloride 14 Aug. 90 0 0 0 0 3 55491
Methotrexate Sodium 15 Oct. 90 1 0 0 0 3 24848
Pyridostigmine Bromide 27 Nov. 90 0 0 0 0 1 2113
Estropipate 27 Feb. 91 0 0 0 0 2 6820
Loperamide Hydrochloride 30 Aug. 91 1 1 1 1 5 31713
Phendimetrazine 30 Oct. 91 0 0 0 0 1 1269
Tolmetin Sodium 27 Nov. 91 1 1 1 1 7 59108
Clemastine Fumarate 31 Jan. 92 0 0 1 0 1 9077
Cinoxacin 28 Feb. 92 0 0 0 0 1 6281
Diltiazem Hydrochloride 30 Mar. 92 1 1 0 0 5 439125
Nortriptyline Hydrochloride 30 Mar. 92 1 0 0 1 3 187683
Triamterene 30 Apr. 92 0 0 0 1 2 22092
Piroxicam 29 May 92 1 1 1 0 9 309756
Griseofulvin Ultramicrocrystalline 30 Jun. 92 0 0 0 0 1 11727
Pyrazinamide 30 Jun. 92 0 0 0 0 1 306
Diflunisal 31 Jul. 92 0 0 1 0 2 96488
Carbidopa 28 Aug. 92 0 0 1 0 4 117233
Pindolol 03 Sep. 92 1 1 0 1 7 37648
Ketoprofen 22 Dec. 92 0 0 0 0 2 107047
Gemfibrozil 25 Jan. 93 1 0 1 0 5 330539
Benzonatate 29 Jan. 93 0 0 0 0 1 2597
Methadone Hydrochloride 15 Apr. 93 0 0 0 0 1 1858
Methazolamide 30 Jun. 93 0 0 0 1 3 4792
Alprazolam 19 Oct. 93 1 1 0 0 7 614593
Nadolol 31 Oct. 93 1 0 0 0 2 125379
Levonorgestrel 13 Dec. 93 0 0 0 0 1 47836
Metoprolol Tartrate 21 Dec. 93 1 1 0 1 9 235625
Naproxen 21 Dec. 93 1 1 1 1 8 456191
Naproxen Sodium 21 Dec. 93 1 1 1 1 7 164771
Guanabenz Acetate 28 Feb. 94 0 0 0 0 2 18120
Triazolam 25 Mar. 94 0 0 0 0 2 71282
Glipizide 10 May 94 1 0 0 0 1 189717
Cimetidine 17 May 94 1 1 0 0 3 547218
Flurbiprofen 20 Jun. 94 1 0 0 0 1 155329
Sulfadiazine 29 Jul. 94 0 0 0 0 1 72
Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate 30 Sep. 94 0 0 0 0 1 8492
Mean 0.45 0.28 0.25 0.25 3.3 126901
Shown is the post-scandal data used in the study. The entry decisions of the four dominant firms
are indicated by 1 for entry and 0 for no entry. Total Entrants are how many of the fifty-one
potential entrants entered, including the dominant firms. Revenue is in thousands of dollars, and
is the revenue of the branded product in the year before patent expiration.
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Table 2. Model Estimates: Posterior Distribution
Number of Potential Entrants
(excluding “other” firms)
Parameter 3 firms 4 firms
Cost: long run average (µc) 10.05 10.07
(0.017) (0.0014)
Cost: persistence (ρc) 0.9866 0.9873
(0.00086) (5.6e-05)
Cost: std. dev. (σc) 0.3721 0.3675
(0.026) (3.0e-04)
Cost spillover (κc) 0.06655 0.07067
(0.0015) (1.1e-04)
Revenue: mean (µr) 9.906 10.008
(0.083) (0.0037)
Revenue: std. dev. (σr) 1.591 1.682
(0.060) (0.0023)
Market share parameter (γ) 0.9375 0.9375
Discount factor (β) 0.9688 0.9688
Misclassification prob. (pa) 0.9375 0.9375
CER firm 1 0.0857 0.1208
CER firm 2 0.0788 0.0876
CER firm 3 0.1038 0.1061
CER firm 4 0.1374
CER all firms 0.0894 0.1130
MCMC Reps 3000000 3000000
stride 375 375
Shown is the mode of the multivariate posterior distribution not the modes
of the marginal posterior distributions. The multivariate posterior mode does
correspond to a set of parameter settings that actually occur in the MCMC
chain whereas other measures of central tendency such as the mean or marginal
medians might not. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. CER is
the classification error rate when the parameters are set to the posterior mode.
They are computed at Step 2e of the importance sampler. At that point in the
algorithm the predicted actions Ai,t,j are known for each firm i at each time t
for each particle j and can be compared to the observed actions Aoit. The CER
is the proportion of the cases where Aoit 6= Ai,t,j computed both by firm and
overall.
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Figure 1. Cost, Revenue, and Entry Decisions. Plotted as a solid line in the first
three panels is the logarithm of cost for the three dominant firms in the three firm model.
The logarithm of cost is computed by averaging at Step 2e of the importance sampler at
the maximum likelihood estimate. The circles in these plots indicate that the firm entered
the market at that time point. The bottom panel shows the logarithm of total revenue. The
numbers at the bottom are the count of the number of dominant firms who entered the market
at that time point.
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Figure 2. Cost and Entry Decisions of the Dominant Firms. Plotted is the logarithm
of cost for the three dominant firms. The dashed line is under the three firm model, and the
solid under the four firm model. The circles indicate the markets that Mylan entered, crosses
the same for Novopharm, and the asterisks for Lemmon. The logarithm of cost as described
in the legend of Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Entry Decisions. Plotted as circles are the entry
decisions of the three dominant firms in the three firm model. The crosses are the average
predictions of the three firm model computed by averaging game solutions at Step 2e of the
importance sampler at the maximum likelihood estimate.
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